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Qualified Retirement Plans: Analysis of Distribution and Rollover Activity
Victoria L. Bryantc, Sarah Holdenb, and John Sabelhausab

Abstract
One potential downside when employees have the freedom to manage their own retirement
accumulations is “leakage” prior to the end of their working careers, which is proxied here using
age 60. Leakage occurs when employees take withdrawals prior to retirement, when they cash
out distributions at job separation, or when they fail to pay back loans taken out against their
accounts. Although leakage has the potential to undermine a participant-driven retirement
system, trend analysis shows that aggregate pre-retirement leakage is modest and trending down
relative to assets, and stable as a share of gross contributions. The probability of receiving a
distribution and the fraction of gross distributions cashed out are roughly equal across income
groups, but the portion cashed out represents a higher percentage of income for the lower-income
groups.
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1. Introduction
One potential downside of a participant-driven employer-sponsored retirement system is
the possibility that significant “leakage” takes place before employees reach retirement. Leakage
occurs when employees take withdrawals prior to retirement, when they cash out lump-sum
distributions at job separation, or when they fail to pay back loans taken out against their
accounts. Although it is possible that leakage could be undermining the account-based pension
system that now dominates in the private sector, the analysis here based on a combination of tax
return, administrative, and survey data suggests those concerns are probably somewhat
exaggerated. That is, leakage from retirement accounts seems relatively modest from both
aggregate time-series and cross-sectional distributional perspectives.
The possible negative effect of leakage on retirement preparedness is receiving increasing
attention, but it is important to remember that policymakers and retirement plan sponsors walk a
fine line when it comes to preventing leakage. 1 Participation in a DC pension plan generally is
voluntary, and employees choose how much they contribute when they do participate. Studies
show that when employees know they can get access to their funds before retirement they are
more likely to participate in the first place, and they contribute more when they do participate. 2
Lawmakers have acknowledged this and made it clear that they understand employees will
sometimes desire access to their savings before retirement for legitimate reasons. Thus, although
pre-retirement withdrawals are discouraged by a 10 percent penalty on top of the income tax
1

See, for example, recent studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009), U.S. Congressional
Research Service (2009), Butrica, et al. (2010), and Davis, et al. (2010).
2
For example, Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor (2000) use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to show that
participation is higher if participants can get access to their funds before retirement. That study also contains an
extensive list of references to other papers that make the same basic point about how access to funds before
retirement increases participation and/or contributions conditional on participating. Holden and VanDerhei (2001)
analyze recordkeeper data and find that the presence of a loan provision increases 401(k) participants’ contributions.
Holden, Brady, and Hadley (2005) contains additional references to loan research literature. It is also worth noting
that recent advances in pension plans, such as the more widespread use of auto enrollment, may affect the extent to
which loan and withdrawal availability affects participation going forward.

owed, withdrawals from retirement plans and IRAs are not prohibited. Congress has even
expanded the reasons for non-penalized withdrawals in recent years to include, for example,
first-time home purchase, educational expenses, and certain emergencies, reducing the tax
consequences of accessing retirement assets at younger ages. 3
Given the trade-off between participation and potential pre-retirement leakage, the public
policy question to address is whether the provisions that allow leakage might be undermining the
U.S. pension system, both generally and for specific subsets of the population. One approach to
answer the question is to analyze aggregate net inflows. In any given year, new contributions are
flowing into the system. At the same time, money is leaving the system as benefit payments,
loans, or withdrawals. Leakage is the subset of the outflows that occurs prior to retirement.
Current contributions to DC pensions by employers and employees are quite high; as a share of
employee compensation, total pension contributions in the private sector have been higher in the
past few years than they ever have been (Clark and Sabelhaus, 2009). However, the only way to
know whether or not a given level of contributions will generate adequate retirement incomes is
to take leakage seriously, and to acknowledge that some of the money flowing into retirement
accounts will leak out (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2007). 4

3

There are several dimensions to the tax code rules affecting retirement plan leakage, varying across pension types
(DB or DC) and IRAs, and the basis for the withdrawal. DB plans do not permit pre-retirement withdrawals, but DC
plans are allowed to permit hardship and in-service withdrawals, and of course money can be taken out of an IRA at
any time. Withdrawals at job change are allowed under both DB and DC, assuming the plan offers lump-sum
distributions. DC plans also have another possible source of leakage, which is failure to repay loans, assuming the
plan offered a loan option in the first place. In general, a 10 percent penalty is assessed on the taxable portion of
pension and IRA withdrawals for most taxpayers younger than 59½. There is one job change exception: if the
taxpayer leaves a DC plan and is 55 or older they can take the money out of that plan without penalty. There are also
a handful of exceptions to the 10 percent penalty, including first-time home purchase (IRA), educational expenses
(IRA), medical expenses (DC plan or IRA), health insurance expenses (IRA), or other specified emergencies.
4

The estimates of retirement plan leakage currently used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007) for their retirement
account simulations are taken from a paper by Hurd and Panis (1996) that is similar in spirit to this paper but based
on the Health and Retirement Study.

The empirical strategy in most of the previous research on retirement plan leakage
involves using household survey data to study the disposition of retirement accounts for
separating employees (Chang, 1996; Burman, Coe, and Gale, 1999; Engelhardt, 2002, 2003;
Hurd and Panis, 2006; Congressional Research Service, 2009; Copeland, 2009a, 2009b). 5 This
approach has the potential advantage of evaluating retirement dispositions in the context of the
overall demographic, labor supply, and financial situation of the household. A number of
common themes emerge from the studies based on household surveys, but there are empirical
issues that suggest one should exercise caution when drawing inferences about overall leakage or
even differences by type of household.
The first general conclusion of the survey-based leakage studies is that the size of the
distribution is a key determinant of the ultimate disposition. That is, very small distributions tend
to be cashed out, while larger distributions are generally rolled over into another qualified
account. 6 Because of this pattern, it is not surprising to find the conclusion in this literature that
“most people cash out, but most dollars are rolled over.” A second finding, highly correlated
with the first, is that lower-income participants are more likely to cash out a distribution, which
gives rise to concerns about distributional outcomes. Lower-income participants are likely to
have contributed less to their plans to begin with, and if they are more likely to cash out when
they separate from their employer, leakage is much more of a potential problem.
However, household surveys fail to capture up to 70 percent of retirement account
distributions in any given year, so using these estimates to draw inferences about overall leakage

5

There is a closely related line of research on IRA drawdown behavior, which could in principle be studied in the
general framework of “leakage.” See, for example, Bryant (2008), Holden and Reid (2008), Sabelhaus (2000),
Sabelhaus and Schrass (2009).
6
Measuring leakage using survey data is problematic for conceptual reasons as well, because some cash-outs go into
other types of saving or repayment of loans. If those types of dispositions are counted as saving instead of leakage
the estimates of non-leaked distributions roughly doubles (Engelhardt, 2003).

or differences across types of families may be somewhat premature. 7 Some of the failure to
measure distributions occurs because household surveys that ask about retirement plan
distributions when the employee separates from a job are missing leakage associated with in-plan
hardship withdrawals. Also, the surveys are generally missing withdrawals from IRAs. 8 It is also
very likely that some participants separating from their employers and choosing direct rollovers
to IRAs or other qualified accounts are simply failing to report those amounts as a distribution,
because the rollover has no tax consequences. 9
The fundamental shortcomings of household survey data are not a problem when using
tax returns or other administrative data to study retirement plan leakage. Flows out of retirement
plans and other qualified accounts can be comprehensively tracked using a combination of the
primary personal income tax return (Form 1040), the information return for retirement account
distributions (Form 1099-R), and the information return for IRAs (Form 5498). Thus, by using
tax data one is able to observe all retirement account distributions, not just lump-sum payouts
that occur at job change. Even data consistency can be effectively analyzed using the tax data,
because, for example, a retirement account distribution generates a Form 1099-R along with (in
principle) the appropriate entries on Form 1040.

7

Burman, Coe, and Gale (1999) arrive at the 70 percent figure by comparing their survey-based distributions with
the tax-based estimates from Sabelhaus and Weiner (1999). Some of the difference is definitional, insofar as the
survey is not designed to capture some of the flows tracked in the tax data, but that speaks to the point of why tax
data are preferable for studying leakage.
8
See Sabelhaus and Schrass (2009).
9
Industry data reinforce the idea that employee perceptions or perhaps even awareness are a key to understanding
why household surveys fail to properly measure distributions. Retirement account assets are often either left in the
employer’s plan when the employee separates or directly rolled over to another qualified account without the money
ever passing through the employee’s hands (Vanguard, 2010).

One downside of using tax data is the relatively limited information about the taxpayers
being studied. 10 However, as in previous work using linked information and primary tax returns,
there are significant insights to be gained about the extent of both aggregate leakage and the
distribution of leakage across some basic demographic characteristics (Sabelhaus and Weiner,
1999). The tax and information returns themselves contain a significant amount of financial
information about households, and marital status can be inferred based on filing status. In
addition, the data file used here has age for both primary and secondary taxpayers, which makes
it possible to evaluate retirement account distributions in a lifecycle context. It is true that the tax
data do not permit one to study why a taxpayer behaves a certain way, but simply documenting
how they behaved with respect to retirement plan distributions is a crucial first step.

2. Trends in Aggregate Retirement Plan Leakage
Employer-sponsored pension coverage in the private sector has been steadily changing
composition from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans since the passage of
ERISA in 1974 (Clark and Sabelhaus, 2009). Assets in DC plans are generally more susceptible
to leakage, because employees often have access to their accumulated balances through loans
and in-service withdrawals in addition to distributions at job separation. 11 Because DC plans
have grown in prominence, leakage has potentially become a much larger problem. However,
administrative and survey data from a variety of sources for the past two decades show no such
upward trend in aggregate leakage, when measured relative to underlying DC balances or gross
contributions to DC plans.
10

Some of that missing information, for example the events associated with the pension withdrawal, are discernible
in the panel data. Future research will involve using the panel to identify events like job change, marital dissolution,
or changes in income that are likely associated with specific types of withdrawals.
11
In DB plans, pre-retirement access is generally limited to cash-outs of lump-sum distributions at job separation.
Loans may be allowed in the DB setting, but Form 5500 data indicate that loan activity in DB plans is rare.

The concept of leakage used in this section is meant to reflect taxable withdrawals prior
to retirement, but data limitations make it necessary to use proxies to distinguish leakage from
other taxable withdrawals. Those proxies are based on splitting the sample by characteristics
such as the age of the taxpayer, the observation of a penalty on the distribution, and failure to
repay loans in order to properly characterize the distribution as leakage or not. 12 The primary
threshold used for characterizing pre-retirement withdrawals as leakage is age 55, but results are
also shown for all taxpayers up to age 60. Although most retirement plan participants continue
working and contributing to their employer-sponsored retirement plans after age 55, that cutoff is
important because the tax code permits non-penalized withdrawals from employer-sponsored
plans after job separation for workers aged 55 or older. Above age 59½ workers can generally
make penalty-free withdrawals from IRAs and DC retirement accounts whether they separate
from their employer or not. 13Again, most participants are still working and contributing at age
60, but the age-based thresholds are a useful way to draw the line as to where a distribution goes
from generally being considered leakage to generally being considered retirement income.
In addition to age, the other attributes of IRA and pension withdrawals that can be
tracked over time are whether or not a penalty is paid on the withdrawal, and whether or not the
distribution reflected a failure to repay a loan (a so-called “deemed” distribution). In general, the
penalty amount is 10 percent of the taxable portion of the distribution, so the inferred penalized
distribution is set to ten times the reported penalty. 14 The extent of deemed distributions can be
measured comprehensively in the cross-sectional tax return data set used in the next section, but
12

The cross-sectional information form data used in the next section make it possible to characterize distributions
from qualified plans regardless of age, insofar as those distributions are directly or indirectly rolled over into other
qualified accounts. However, in those data it is not possible to say for sure that a particular distribution is leakage,
because (for example) distributions that are not rolled over are not necessarily spent. In any event, the time-series
analysis here relies on data from Form 1040 where direct and indirect rollovers are not distinguishable.
13
The tax code permits in-service withdrawals, but some plan sponsors do not.
14
In practice this is a slight underestimate, because 10 percent is technically the largest penalty a taxpayer can face.

in order to construct aggregate trends, the analysis in this section is restricted to private-sector
DC plans. The data on deemed distributions from private-sector DC plans is available from the
year 2000 and forward from the Department of Labor’s Form 5500 data series. 15
In order to benchmark withdrawals over time one needs corresponding data on total DC
and IRA assets by age. The denominators against which to benchmark trends in pre-retirement
withdrawals are constructed using the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1992
through 2007. The SCF is a household survey, and thus balances can be aggregated across
several possible dimensions. For most of the leakage measures here that means tracking total
retirement account balances by age over time. The total DC and IRA balances in the SCF track
published aggregates over time (from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds accounts and
data from the Investment Company Institute) quite well, and thus the account balances by age are
also assumed to be representative across age groups.
Several measures of aggregate pre-retirement withdrawals relative to underlying assets
suggest that leakage is very modest in all years, and if anything leakage has been trending down
over time (Figure 1). The specific measures of leakage shown here are (1) penalized withdrawals
relative to total DC and IRA assets for all ages, (2) penalized withdrawals for taxpayers younger
than 55 relative to DC and IRA assets for that age group, (3) total taxable withdrawals for
taxpayers younger than 55 relative to DC and IRA assets for that age group, and (4) total taxable
withdrawals for taxpayers younger than 60 relative to DC and IRA assets for that age group. 16
The various measures provide a fairly wide range for the leakage estimates, but the differences

15

The Private Pension Plan Bulletin is published annually by the U.S. Department of Labor, and is available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/form5500dataresearch.html.
16
Throughout, the “age” for a joint tax return is set to the older of the primary and secondary taxpayers.

are intuitive, and all support the assertion that aggregate leakage is modest and declining despite
being biased towards overestimating leakage. 17
Penalized withdrawals are the narrowest concept of leakage considered in Figure 1.
Overall, penalized withdrawals in 2007 were just over 0.5 percent of account balances, and that
ratio has fallen over time. This statistic is arguably biased by the phasing in of the DC- and IRAbased retirement system over the past few decades, though, because the aging of the system has
been associated with the aging of the typical participant in the system. To control for this, the
second measure restricts the comparison to penalized withdrawals over account balances for
taxpayers younger than age 55. Most of the penalty occurs for taxpayers younger than age 55,
but they own less than half of the DC and IRA assets, so the penalized withdrawal to asset
measure for this group is double that for the entire population. Still, at 1.2 percent of assets in
2007, penalized withdrawals for the younger than 55 age group are relatively modest.
The other measures shown in Figure 1 are based on total taxable withdrawals, which
include penalized withdrawals, but also the non-penalized amounts taken out because of
exceptions in the tax code (first-time home buying, hardship, and education) or the initiation of
retirement income payouts (for those 55 to 59 years old). Adding non-penalized withdrawals
raises the estimated leakage to asset ratio significantly, but again, the overall withdrawal rates are
modest at just over 2.0 percent for taxpayers younger than 55, and about 2.5 percent for
taxpayers younger than 60. As with the penalized withdrawal percentages, overall taxable
withdrawals relative to account balances have been declining over time.
17

In 1989 the ratio of total IRA and DC plan (or “thrift plans” in SCF terminology) assets in the SCF to Investment
Company Institute published totals was 83 percent, and the ratio was 89 percent in 2007. Because the SCF totals are
10 to 15 percent below the published aggregates, the estimates here of leakage relative to assets are biased upwards.
The SCF totals are used as the denominator for total penalized withdrawals in addition to the age-specific measures
to maintain a consistency across the measures in Figure 1. In addition, the denominator in these calculations is DC
plan and IRA assets, and because some of the outflows are from DB plans, the leakage estimates are biased up even
more.

The gap between penalized and total withdrawals underscores the fact that the Form 1040
tax data alone are not sufficient to characterize retirement account outflows as leakage—it is an
upper bound for several reasons. Taxpayers could be shifting the money into other accounts
(including Roth IRAs) or paying down debt, not necessarily spending it. Engelhardt (2002) refers
to this distinction as “tax-qualified” versus “wealth-preserving” use of the distribution—he finds
that the latter may be twice the former. Also, it is useful to keep in mind that although taking a
withdrawal in order to pay for education is a form of leakage, it does not mean that it is an
undesirable outcome.
The perspective one gains from considering overall penalized and non-penalized
withdrawals for pre-retirees gives a sense that leakage is modest and trending down, and that
impression is reinforced by looking at aggregate leakage relative to aggregate contributions
(Figure 2). Although there is no single data source that tracks aggregate DC and IRA
contributions, it is possible to piece together new contributions from a variety of sources. 18 The
numerator used to compare leakage with new contributions is the narrow total penalized
withdrawals measure repeated from Figure 1, in order to avoid any contagion from using total
taxable withdrawals that may be associated with retirement or portfolio shifts. In that sense,
Figure 2 presents a direct answer to the question: for every dollar that goes into the DC and IRA
system, how many cents leak out through penalized withdrawals in the same year? The answer
for the past twenty years has been a remarkably steady 14 percent or 15 percent of gross inflows
leaking out. Although the data series is somewhat limited from a time perspective, the two

18

The denominator in Figure 2 includes new contributions to DC plans from the Department of Labor’s Form 5500
data series (see footnote 15), unpublished data on contributions to the federal employee Thrift Saving Plan, and taxdeductible IRA contributions from the IRS Statistics of Income. The key missing contribution flows are
contributions to state and local government 457 retirement plans and non-profit 403(b) plans.

business cycle troughs (1991 and 2000) are associated with a higher penalized withdrawal to
contribution ratios.
The final component of the aggregate trend analysis in this section focuses on one source
of possible leakage, loans from retirement plans. It is important to note that loans themselves are
not a form of leakage, though they can lead to leakage directly if the participant separates and
fails to repay the loan (or lowers subsequent contributions, but that effect cannot be measured
directly). In any event, loans relative to private-sector DC plan assets are relatively small and
stable over time, and the amount of “deemed” distributions from failure to repay loans is also
small and stable (Figure 3). 19 The actual leakage relative to balances is thus the product of two
small and stable ratios, which is a tiny and stable fraction of plan assets. In 2007, only 0.02
percent of private-sector DC plan assets leaked out because of a failure to repay loans.

3. The Distribution of Retirement Plan Leakage
Even though aggregate retirement plan leakage seems modest and declining over time,
leakage may still be an issue of possible concern from a distributional perspective. That is, in any
given year, the leakage that does occur may be concentrated among lower-income workers,
which would suggest that financial mistakes could be undermining retirement security for the
most vulnerable part of the population. In fact, a careful inspection of the distribution of
retirement plan leakage using a combination of tax returns and information returns (Forms 1099R and 5498) shows that leakage is actually distributed across income groups, and, after
controlling for income, even surprisingly balanced across pre-retirement age groups.

19

The Form 5500 data report negligible amounts of participant loans and deemed distributions of participant loans
in private-sector DB plans (see U.S. Department of Labor 2010). Those are not analyzed here.

The analysis of the distribution of leakage presented here is based on a sequential
analysis of withdrawal activity, and the specific steps are driven somewhat by data limitations. In
a world of perfect data, researchers would have access to panel data that tracks retirement plan
coverage along with contributions to and withdrawals from retirement accounts. The perfect data
set would also have the key socioeconomic information needed to study how behavior varies
across population subgroups. The SOI tax return data used here is cross-sectional, and basic
demographics (age and filing status) along with reported income on tax returns are the only
controls available.
A key missing piece of the puzzle is micro data on retirement plan contributions. Using
information returns along with Form 1040 makes it possible to measure employee contributions
to retirement plans, because those contributions show up as deferred compensation on the W-2.
However, the W-2 does not track employer contributions, which the aggregate data suggest are
significant—about 40 percent of total private-sector DC plan contributions, based on Form 5500
data. 20 Thus, it is not possible to directly construct the same sort of “net contributions” estimate
across age and income groups using the micro data that was presented above for the aggregate
trend analysis. 21
Instead, the approach to distributional analysis here relies on identifying whether the
taxpayer might be exposed to retirement plan leakage by virtue of having retirement coverage or
retirement accounts, then calculating the percent of those exposed to leakage who actually
experienced gross or taxable distributions, and then calculating the average fraction of the gross
distribution that can be considered possible leakage. The key to the distributional insights is that
even after controlling for coverage and/or retirement account ownership, the propensity to have a
20

See footnote 15 for a description of the Form 5500 data.
One possible strategy is to use micro data on employee and employer contributions to retirement plans from the
Survey of Consumer Finances. Those data will be an important component of the next steps in this research agenda.

21

distribution and the fraction of any gross distribution that is taxable are fairly stable across
income groups.
The starting point for the distributional analysis is acknowledging that retirement plan
coverage varies across tax filers, by age, income, and married versus single filing status (Figures
4a and 4b). The criteria for being exposed to possible leakage is that the tax filing unit (the tax
return) have one or more of the following: evidence of employer-sponsored retirement plan
coverage on Form W-2, evidence of an IRA with a positive balance on Form 5498, or evidence
of an actual distribution from a qualified retirement plan on Form 1099-R. This inclusive
approach to identifying taxpayers exposed to retirement plan leakage means, for example, that a
particular taxpayer need not have current coverage—they are included even if all they have is a
withdrawal from a plan in which they (or a spouse) was previously covered. Indeed, this
selection decision has a big impact on the withdrawal-to-income estimates presented later,
because many of those who are filing in the current year have only the retirement account
distribution, and thus show up in the lower-income groups and are characterized as having
leakage that represents 100 percent of their income.
Retirement plan participation rises with both income and age in the younger than 60
population (Figure 4a). Overall, 60 percent of tax returns filed by this group include some
indication of coverage, but that ranges from just under 20 percent for the lowest income deciles
up to nearly 100 percent for the highest income deciles. The coverage estimates also show a
consistent positive age effect, especially for the lower-income groups. These patterns reflect a
typical lifecycle story of retirement plan participation, insofar as participation rises with both
income and age, with income being the more dominant factor.

Although the pattern of retirement plan participation seems to rise linearly across income
deciles when joint and single returns are viewed together, that pattern masks an important
subtlety when the two are separated (Figure 4b). 22 Joint filers are considered to have coverage if
either the primary or secondary filer meets one of the three criteria laid out above. The data show
that single filers are always less likely to have retirement plan participation than joint filers—
overall the percentages with coverage are 78 percent and 49 percent. The joint returns also
exhibit a very different pattern of coverage across income groups, with participation rising much
more steeply as income increases from the lowest decile, with well over half of tax filers in the
middle income deciles participating in (or having had participated in) some sort of qualified
account.
Having narrowed down the tax-filing population to include only those filers who are
possibly exposed to leakage, the next step is to determine what percentage of each age, income,
and filing status group actually received a qualified distribution during the year (Figures 5a, 5b).
Overall, 24 percent of tax filers with evidence of participation received a distribution. The
overall patterns of gross distribution events by income has a slight u-shape within any given age
group (and for all age groups younger than 60 combined) but the range is within a few
percentage points of the overall average for the group. The slightly higher rate of gross
distributions for lower-income tax returns may reflect a sampling effect, meaning those tax units
would not have filed a return had it not been for the gross distribution.
Although the differences in the incidence of distributions by income group are modest,
there is a significant increase in the probability of having a gross distribution (conditional on

22

The income deciles for joint and single returns are determined separately, and as expected, the distribution cutoffs
for joint filers are much higher. Thus, tabulating using one set of decile breaks would push a disproportionate share
of single filers into the lower income decile groups, and a disproportionate share of the joint filers into the upperincome groups.

participating in a retirement plan) as age increases. Differences in receipt of gross distributions
by age and filing status do not add much in the way of insights about the likelihood of
distributions, though there is some evidence that the very high rate of gross distributions among
the lower-income part of the oldest age group (55 to 59) is driven by single filers.
Not every tax payer receiving a gross distribution has a taxable distribution, because
many roll the entire distribution over to another qualified account. Overall, about two-thirds of
the taxpayers younger than 60 with gross distributions indicate that at least part of the
distribution is taxable (Figures 6a, 6b). The variation in incidence of taxable distributions by
income is a muted version of the gross distribution pattern, which is another way of saying that
the ratio of taxable to gross distribution incidence does not exhibit a lot of variation by income.
The characteristic more strongly correlated with taxable distributions is age. About 75 percent of
those with a gross distribution in the 55 to 59 age group are at least partially taxable.
The higher rate of taxable distributions for some taxpayers may reflect a sample selection
effect. That is, a lower-income single filer, especially in the 55 to 59 age range, may be filing a
tax return only because they have a qualified distribution—otherwise, they would not have been
required to file a return. If the tax filer has no other income, and only the taxable portion of the
qualified distribution shows up in AGI, then they are characterized as being a lower-income
person who is experiencing significant leakage relative to income. This potential problem
underscores the need to use the panel dimension of the SOI to better classify the particular tax
filer (they might have higher income in other years) and to help understand why the withdrawal
is their only source of income (they might have just experienced a divorce).
A better understanding of the role of leakage relative to income involves two more steps.
The first question is how much of the gross distribution actually becomes taxable? There are

several possible outcomes when a participant receives a gross distribution (Table 1). Overall, for
tax filers younger than 60, taxable distributions are 38.0 percent of gross distributions, and
amount to 2.5 percent of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). The lion’s share of the non-taxable
amount reflects a direct rollover from one qualified account to another. Some distributions can
be characterized as “indirect rollovers” because there is evidence of a gross distribution which
the tax filer did not report as taxable, and for which there is an unexplained inflow to an IRA
reported on the Form 5498.
The other types of non-taxable rollovers include non-taxable Roth distributions, return of
after-tax contributions to qualified plans, Section 1035 exchanges (involving the purchase of
annuities and other qualified insurance products), and a residual “other” category where there is
no information return-based explanation for why the taxpayer did not report the distribution as
taxable. There are many explanations for why that might occur, but it is possible that some of
those (inferred) non-taxable distributions reflect inconsistencies between the information returns
and Form 1040 due to non-reporting of cash-outs.
The overall ratio of taxable to gross distributions is 38 percent, but the more interesting
distributional question is how that propensity to cash out a distribution varies by age, income,
and filing status. One of the most striking findings in the data is the nearly flat ratio of taxable to
gross distributions across these dimensions (Figures 7a, 7b). If anything, there is a slight inverted
u-shape to the cash-out percentages across income groups, with those in the middle of the
income distribution exhibiting higher cash-out rates than in either tail. Cash-out rates are
noticeably lower for the highest income group and generally lower for joint filers at any given
age and income combination, but the bulk of the cash-out ratios across the groups fall into the 30
percent to 50 percent range.

The final step is characterizing taxable distributions relative to AGI across age, income,
and filing status groups (Figures 8a, 8b).The effect of selecting on tax filers is evident—the
older/lower income groups have high taxable withdrawals to AGI ratios, but that is in part due to
the fact that some of the tax filers in the sample are there only because they had taxable
distributions. The overall ratio of taxable withdrawals to AGI for the under-60 population is 2.5
percent, but it is much lower (1.0 percent, 1.5 percent, and 1.9 percent) for the younger than 35,
35 to 44, and 45 to 54 groups, respectively. Overall, these distributional estimates of taxable
withdrawals relative to income are consistent with the aggregate estimates presented above. 23

4. Conclusions
There are several ways to think about what retirement plan “leakage” means, and how to
measure leakage given available data. The estimates here suggest that leakage is very low
relative to aggregate retirement account balances: In 1992, at most 3.9 percent of assets were
distributed prematurely; in 2007, only at most 2.5 percent were distributed prematurely. Systemwide, penalized withdrawals ran at most perhaps 15 percent of new contributions in any given
year. In 2007, only 16 percent of tax returns with employer-sponsored retirement plan coverage
or IRA ownership had leakage activity, that is, taxable withdrawals prior to age 60.
From a distributional perspective, tax returns show that the presence of employersponsored retirement plan coverage or IRA ownership tends to rise with age and income. Tax
returns of younger individuals were less likely to have taxable distributions compared with tax
returns of older individuals. Incidence of taxable distribution activity varied little by income,
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Aggregate penalized withdrawals are about 15 percent of contributions in any given year, and taxable withdrawals
are just about double penalized withdrawals. Taxable withdrawals to AGI range from 1.0 to 1.9 percent. Given that
overall contributions (from Figure 2) are running about six percent of AGI (from the data underlying Figures 5
through 8) the three to one ratio of contributions to leakage is approximately confirmed.

with the exception of the lowest income deciles, which have higher propensity to have
distributions (but there is an endogeneity problem that they filed only because of the
distribution).
When attempting to evaluate the extent of leakage, it is important to keep in mind that an
individual’s willingness to participate in and contribute to retirement accounts in the first place is
to some extent dependent on their ability to access those savings prior to retirement in the event
of economic need. Auto enrollment and other innovations in pension arrangements may well
affect this tradeoff going forward, but the tension between participating today and having an
option to cash out early if needed is likely to remain an important feature of the pension
landscape. Thus, when judging “leakage,” one needs to be cognizant of the fact that there might
not have been anything to leak out in the first place if policy were much more restrictive. Or as
Shakespeare might have said: ‘Tis better to have saved and leaked, than never to have saved at
all.
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Figure 1. Measures of Aggregate Leakage Relative to DC Plan and IRA Assets
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Figure 2. Total Penalized Withdrawals Relative to DC Plan and IRA Contributions
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Figure 3. Private Defined Contribution Plan Loans and Deemed Distributions
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Figure 4a. Evidence of Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plan Coverage or IRA Ownership
by Age and Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
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Figure 4b. Evidence of Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plan Coverage or IRA Ownership
by Age, Filing Status, and Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
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Figure 5a. Percent of Covered Tax Returns with Gross Distributions by Age and Adjusted
Gross Income (AGI)
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Figure 5b. Percent of Covered Taxpayers with Gross Distributions by Age, Filing Status,
and Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
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Figure 6a. Percent of Covered Tax Returns with Taxable Distributions by Age and Adjusted
Gross Income (AGI)
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Figure 7a. Ratio of Taxable Distributions to Gross Distributions by Age and Adjusted Gross
Income (AGI)
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Figure 8a Ratio of Taxable Distributions to Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) by Age and AGI
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Figure 8b. Ratio of Taxable Distributions to Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) by Age, Filing
Status, and AGI
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Table 1. Gross and Taxable Distributions from Qualified Retirement Accounts for Taxpayers Above and Below Age 60
Billions of dollars
All Taxpayers
Age Less Than 60
Age 60 and Older
Taxpayers with Gross Distributions
Gross Distributions

$1,157.8

$348.9

$808.9

- Non Taxable Distributions
Direct rollovers to other qualified accounts
Indirect rollovers to other qualified accounts
Non-taxable distributions from Roth accounts
Return of after-tax contributions to qualified plans
Section 1035 exchanges
Other non-taxable distributions

$489.5
335.8
6.8
4.8
59.1
49.5
33.1

$214.4
172.5
2.3
0.8
14.4
8.9
15.3

$275.1
163.3
4.4
4.1
44.6
40.6
17.8

= Taxable Distributions
Non-Penalized
Penalized

$661.8
612.2
49.5

$132.7
85.8
46.9

$529.1
526.4
2.7

87,925
36,065
15.7%
9.0%
52.9%

62,114
15,057
6.7%
2.5%
13.4%

25,811
21,008
37.2%
24.3%
0.3%

Addendum
Number of returns with qualified coverage (thousands)
Number of returns with gross distributions (thousands)
Gross distributions as a percent of AGI for covered
Taxable distributions as a percent of AGI for covered
Taxable distributions as a percent of gross distributions

Notes: Age for joint returns is based on the older of the primary or secondary taxpayer. Excludes dependent filers.
Source: Tax Year 2007 Statistics of Income Individual Complete Report Matched Form 1040, Form 5498, and Form 1099-R File
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